Last updated: December 2007
Japan Detention Profile
Detention History and Politics
Japan’s postwar migration control is modeled on the U.S. system. The policy of detaining irregular migrants can be traced back to the era of Allied occupation of Japan. After the Pacific War, the Supreme Command Allied Power initiated repatriation programs of colonial migrants—people who had moved across internal boundaries of the Japanese empire before or during the Pacific War—and controlled Japanese borders to prevent population flows from Japan’s former colonies. By 1951, more than 48,000 “illegal entrants” from the Korean Peninsula and China had been arrested by police or members of the Allied Occupation Forces (Morris-Suzuki 2006). The so-called illegal migrants were detained in migrant detention centers, among which the two main camps were at Senzaki in Yamaguchi prefecture and at Hario near Sasebo (Morris-Suzuki 2006).
After the end of the Allied occupation, the Japanese government strictly regulated immigration. Japan is sometimes regarded as a unique case for achieving economic growth without importing labor during its period of economic expansion in 1960s to 1970s, although this is disputed by some scholars who point to the large numbers of Koreans who emigrated to Japan during this period but who, because of their “illegal” status, were not documented in official records (Morris-Suzuki 2006). The number of foreign migrant workers started to increase significantly in the 1980s, driven in part by the Japanese economic boom and labor shortages. While the labor shortage was felt most acutely in low-skilled sectors such as manual labor in small- and medium-scale manufacturing and construction outfits, the Japanese government continued to resist the legal migration of unskilled workers into the country. The combination of labor shortage and lack of formal mechanisms for importing unskilled foreign workers resulted in the influx of undocumented immigrant workers, mostly visa “overstayers,” into the construction industry and into small- and medium-scale industrial enterprises (Cornelius 1994).
Small- and medium-size firms have lobbied the government to import less skilled workers since the late 1960s in order to alleviate labor shortages. The government did not change its official stance of not admitting less skilled migrant workers, but a few labor-importing devices were created to respond to industrial needs. A corporate trainee program and the recruitment of Nikkeijin (descendants of Japanese emigrants) have supplied about 150,000 legal, unskilled foreign laborers to Japan per year (Cornelius 1994).
Observers also have noted that the government “allows” some unauthorized migration (Asis 2004). Student visas have been used to import unskilled workers (Cornelius 1994), while entertainment visas are a channel to recruit foreign women to meet the labor demand in the entertainment industry (Cameron 2003). The number of overstayers for these types of visas remains high. From 2001 to 2006, approximately 15,000 people overstayed their student visas each year; more than 10,000 overstayed entertainment visas each year.
The large number of overstayers has been perceived as the main immigration problem in Japan (Cornelius 1994; Immigration Bureau 2006). While immigration has never been at the top of any prime minister’s agenda or a priority for the Diet (Noguchi 2007), there is heated debate over immigration, which is dominated by two conflicting interests: the need to restrict immigration (to address claims that crimes committed by foreigners have increased), and the call for a relaxation of labor import controls (to alleviate labor shortages). Japan’s National Police Agency has called attention to the allegedly widespread crimes committed by foreigners, implicitly blaming foreigners for a crime surge in Japan. However, statistics call in to question this conclusion, pointing to the extremely low percentage (under 3 percent) of crimes committed by foreigners in Japan (Special Rapporteur on Racism 2006). To address what it considers the “hotbed of serious crimes” created by visa overstayers, the Ministry of Justice implemented an “Action Plan for the Realization of a Society Strongly Resistant to Crime” in December 2003, which aims to halve the number of irregular foreign residents in Japan by 2008 (Ministry of Justice).
To meet this objective, in February 2004, the Immigration Bureau created an online reporting system through which citizens can anonymously report on any “suspected illegal migrant” (Special Rapporteur on Racism 2006). Raids and roundups of undocumented migrants multiplied in 2004, while entry and admission procedures became stricter (Taipei Times 2004 and Kashiwazaki 2006). More than 40,000 irregular migrants were deported in 2004, an increase of more than 5,000 from 2003 (Immigration Bureau 2006).
The Japanese Business Federation has appealed to government for broader immigration to ease labor shortages (French 2003; Clammer and Ogishima 2006). This business group has also sought amnesty for otherwise law-abiding overstayers, citing the danger of keeping this population in legal shadows (Clarke 2005). A 1989 survey showed that public opinion favored the legalization of foreigners who were already in Japan but lacked authorization to work. The dependence of local business on foreign labor led to a more accommodating policy toward immigrants at the local level, especially in “company towns” (Cornelius 1994).
Concerns have also been raised over the implications of strict immigration control to foreign residents in Japan. The too sweeping criminalization of visa overstays does not differentiate the foreign residents who fail to remember to keep their visa or resident card (Gaijin card) valid from the irregular migrants who came to Japan with intention to stay and work in Japan without proper documentations. Foreign residents, who overlook their administrative obligation, albeit only for one day, can be subjected to “incarceration, fines, and expulsion.” (Arudou 2004) Furthermore, as part of an immigration law enacted in 2006, the government intended to put in place a new foreign visitors monitoring system. The screening system will require foreign citizens to be fingerprinted, photographed, and questioned upon their arrival in Japan, including Japan’s foreign residents. Critics over the screening measures fear that it could deter visitors and discourage business, as well creating unnecessary administrative burden to foreign residents (Fackler 2007).
Policymakers’ concern over maintaining Japanese culture and ethnical homogeneity is argued to be one reason behind the government’s reluctance to encourage migration despite the need for migrant workers. Migration is restricted not only on the level of migrants’ skills, but also on the duration of migrants’ time in the country. Migrants can work in Japan only temporarily, including skilled workers and professionals who the country encourages to immigrate. By not admitting migrants as permanent residents, some in Japan believe that social conflicts can be prevented and that sociocultural assimilation problems can be minimized (Cornelius 1994). Public opinion has consistently opposed higher levels of immigration. Many Japanese oppose having foreigners living in their neighborhoods. They are also unwilling to accept foreigners, even despite long-term residence and fluency in the Japanese language and culture, as in the case of discrimination against the Korean community in Japan (Merviö 2003).
Deportation and detention are viewed as suitable measures “to keep order in Japanese society by excluding unwelcome foreign nationals from Japan” (Immigration Bureau 2006). While it is not clear whether there has been debate over detention as part of immigration control, many have raised concerns over the nature of immigration detention. Debate on immigration detention is dominated by the concern over the detention of asylum seekers and abusive treatment in detention facilities. The Japanese government agenda of countering terrorism has led to the arbitrary detention of Afghan asylum seekers. The controversies surrounding these detentions have helped generate a nationwide refugee rights movement. Public pressure from this movement has reportedly resulted in the release of the detainees and led to reforms of the asylum system (Kaneko 2003).
There have reportedly been numerous lawsuits against the government over the abusive treatment of detainees in immigration detention facilities. While authorities have refused to acknowledge dozens of complaints regarding treatment in detention facilities, two courts have ordered the government to pay compensation in two cases: 1) for “excessive violence” used by officials in facilities (Osaka District Court, 21 January 2003) and 2) for unsuitably long isolation periods and the lengthy use of metal handcuffs (Tokyo District Court, 28 June 2001) (Japan Federation of Bar Associations 2007).





