Last updated: September 2009
Italy Detention Profile
A significant emigrant nation during much of its history, Italy has in recent decades become a key border state within the European Union, receiving tens of thousands of African immigrants and asylum seekers yearly (UN Service 2009a). Under pressure from EU neighbours and its own public, the country has fortified its maritime border control efforts over the past several years. It has also increased the number of secure detention centres and engaged a broad array of actors to assist in the treatment of detainees, including the Italian Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the UN High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR). In 2008, the government of Silvio Berlusconi declared a state of emergency in Italy, citing the high volume of irregular migrants trying to reach the country. Since then, the government has stepped up the controversial practice of “push backs” and introduced laws which, inter alia, criminalize unauthorized presence in the country.
Detention policy. Italy’s detention practices and laws on unauthorized immigration have undergone numerous changes since the 1980s. The country first introduced legislation to restrict immigration in 1986 with the Norme in materia di collocamento e di trattamento dei lavoratori extracomunitari immigrati e contro le immigrazioni clandestine (Norms for the placement and treatment of migrants, migrant workers and against illegal immigration) (Veugelers 1994, p. 39).
In 1989, the country adopted the Legge Martelli (Martelli Law), which established provisions for the recognition of asylum-seekers, legal procedures for the expulsion of irregular migrants, and time limits for when non-citizens must depart Italy after being issued a deportation order (Veugelers 1994, p. 42; HRW 2006, p. 103).
The government of Romano Prodi introduced mandatory detention for irregular migrants in the 1998 Legge Turco-Napolitano (Turco-Napolitano Law). This change in immigration law led to the publication of a unified text on immigration, Testo unico delle disposizioni concernenti la disciplina dell’immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello straniero, which contains provisions against illegal immigration (Art. 12). It also establishes the grounds for issuing an administrative expulsion order, including for overstaying a visa by more than two months and entering Italy by evading border controls (Art. 13). Article 14 of the Testo unico establishes that irregular migrants (as well as asylum seekers) can be detained at specified facilities for a period "strictly limited to the time necessary to determine the identity and qualification for remaining in Italy, and for determining whether or not they should be deported.”
The 2002 Legge Bossi-Fini (Bossi-Fini Law) made further changes in detention policy. It established plans to expand and strengthen immigration detention (assistance and infrastructure) with the allocation of over 70 million Euros between 2002-2004 (Art. 13). Article 35 of this legislation provides that the Central Directorate of the Immigration and Frontiers Police be the authority responsible for the management of immigration-related issues, with the police authorized to carry out all border control activities, including expulsions (Art. 35). In addition, this law set the maximum length of detention—which was modified in 2009—at 30 days, a period extendable by an additional 30 days when necessary to carry out deportations (Art. 13).
In May 2008 the then-newly elected Berlusconi government declared a “state of emergency” in Italy, citing among other issues the “persistent and extraordinary influx of non-EU citizens” and the presence of Roma and Sinti nomadic communities. The declaration had a significant impact on the country’s migration detention practices. Following the declaration, the government adopted a “Security Package” aimed at facilitating expulsions, introduced a law criminalizing unauthorized presence in the country, and renamed the CPTs to “Centri di identificazione ed espulsione” (CIE), or “Identification and Expulsion Centres” (Merlino 2009, p. 1). Among the penalties introduced were “mandatory arrest and fast track trial for foreigners who remain in Italy notwithstanding an expulsion order” and fines for illegal entry (WGAD 2009b, p. 15). The military was also commissioned to perform immigration-related police operations across the country; and the status of “illegal migrant” was added to the list of aggravating circumstances (Art. 1(f)) of the Italian penal code (Merlino 2009, p. 7-8).
In July 2009, the government adopted the Disposizioni in materia di sicurezza pubblica (Provisions relating to public safety), which amended the 1998 Unified Text on Immigration. Article 6 of the Unified Text was amended to introduce the crime of irregular stay in Italy, punishable with imprisonment of up to one year and a fine of up to 2,000 Euros. Article 14 was amended to include provisions that allow for the imprisonment for up to four years of non-citizens found to have remained in the country in violation of an expulsion order. Further, when a non-citizen’s permit has expired by more than 60 days, and no request for renewal has been made, the non-citizen can be imprisoned for a period of between six months and one year.
The new legislation also extends the maximum length of detention of irregular immigrants from 60 days to 180 days (Art. 14 of the United Text). This new maximum duration of detention is in line with the EU return directive (Directive 2008/115/EC), to allow sufficient time for the identification of uncooperative migrants and to coordinate with their countries of origin for their return (Merlino 2009, p. 10; WGAD 2009a, p. 18).
Interestingly, the Interior Ministry has, on its website, drawn a clear distinction between “illegal” and “irregular” migrants, stating, “Foreigners who entered Italy without a regular entry visa are illegal immigrants. Foreigners who lost the conditions necessary to stay in Italy (i.e. expired and not renewed permit of residence that they held when they entered Italy) are irregular immigrants. According to regulations in force, illegal immigrants must be removed” (Interior Ministry Website).
Italy’s detention practices have also been shaped in recent years by the numerous agreements it has made with neighbouring states and international organizations.
In March 2006, the Italian government finalized an agreement with UNCHR, IOM, and the Red Cross to put in place a pilot program requiring all the partners to maintain a constant presence at the detention facility on Lampedusa, an island off the south coast of Sicily that serves as a key migrant interdiction spot in the Mediterranean (CPT 2007a, p. 10; HRW 2006). UNHCR helps identify asylum applicants and aids the processing of claims; IOM provides information to the immigrants about Italian legislation on migration matters and assists immigrants who opt to voluntarily return to their countries of origin; the Red Cross takes charge of unaccompanied minors and provides general humanitarian assistance to detainees (CPT 2007a, p. 10).
Describing the pilot program, entitled Praesidium and jointly funded by the Italian government and the European Union, the Red Cross states that it “aims at strengthening the management capacity of mixed migration flows arriving in [Lampedusa]. The phenomenon of migration is very complex and the management of so-called ‘mixed flows’ requires an equally complex, multi-sector approach of intervention founded on the principles of intra-agency cooperation and security” (Croce Rossa, “Progetto PRAESIDIUM”).
The program, which has been lauded by the CPT, has been extended to other parts of Italy (CPT 2007a, p. 10; Croce Rossa, “Progetto PRAESIDIUM”). Mobile units were created in 2007 as part of phase II of the Praesidium project, “to follow up on Lampedusa activities and monitor landings in Sicily” (UNHCR, “PRAESIDIUM”).
Despite efforts to improve some detention practices, Italy has also been engaged in the controversial practice of “push-backs” (respingimento), forcibly redirecting boats at sea en route to Italy back to Libya (not a signatory country to the Refugee Convention). Observers have argued that this practice aggravates a growing humanitarian crisis of deaths at sea due to sinking migrant smuggling vessels. Antonio Guterres, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, has called for a convention between Italy, Malta, and Libya to address the increasing rates of irregular migration across the Mediterranean and ensure that people are not sent back to places “where their lives or freedom would be jeopardized” (UN News Service 2009c).
For its part, Italy has defended push-backs, claiming that when the identities of migrants are clear and transportation is readily available, there is no need to impose administrative detention, and the police can immediately escort a migrant to the border without judicial validation (Government of Italy 2007, n. xvi). Non-citizens who are interdicted before arriving in Italy are, the government claims, better off as they can still enter Italy through the official process, while those who have been expelled from the country are banned from re-entering Italy for 10 years (Government of Italy 2007, p. 21). According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), “once the Italian government has expelled foreigners back to Libya, it also pays for charter flights for Libya to send the people home.” Some fifty charter flights transported 5,668 people between August 2003 and December 2004 (HRW 2006, p. 112).
Italy has approximately 30 readmission agreements with countries for the return of their citizens, including Morocco and Tunisia (HRW 2006, p. 118). There is no formal agreement with Libya, however, the country to which Italy returns the majority of migrants (HRW 2006, p.117; Government of Italy 2007). Instead, Italy has supported Libya’s immigration control efforts through verbal agreements and the provision of “technical assistance.” According to the Italian government, the country provides “a program of technical assistance to the Libyan Authorities,” including in professional training; assistance for the repatriation of illegal migrants to Third Countries; the supply of goods and services; setting up reception centres for illegal migrants; and operational and investigative cooperation (Government of Italy 2007, p.16).
Detention Infrastructure. Italy operates two distinct types of secure detention facilities, I Centri di Accoglienza (CDA) (literally “Welcome Centres”); and I Centri di Identificazione ed Espulsione (CIE) (“Identification and Expulsion Centres”). Non-citizens who are detained for not having appropriate authorization to be in Italy are initially detained at the CDAs. Once their status is determined, they are either transferred to a deportation centre—CIE—or a non-secure centre for asylum seekers (Interior Ministry “I Centri dell’immigrazione”). The CIEs were established under Law n. 92 of 23 May 2008, to replace the Centri di Permanenza Temporanea ed Assistenza.
Both the CDAs and the CIAs fall under the authority of the Interior Ministry’s Department of Civil Liberties and Immigration. While the overall authority for both types of centres is centralized, the CDAs and CIEs have separate management structures. The management of the CDAs remains at the national level, with the Central Directorate of Civil Services for Immigration and Asylum (Direzione Centrale dei servizi per l’immigrazione e l’asilo), which also facilitates the verification process to determine whether detained immigrants can remain in Italy (Interior Minitry website). Some CDAs contract out the provision of services to non-governmental groups (CDU 2006).
CIEs are managed at the local level, by the prefectures, including the questura (the local police) and the local magistrate, who play an administrative role in determining identification and subsequent deportation measures, if required. Local prefectures have service contracts with a variety of private entities, including non-governmental groups, for the provision of basic needs and services within facilities (Interior Ministry “I centri dell’immigrazione”).
Guidelines on the management of the CIEs and CDAs, called the Bianco Directive, were developed in 2000 for the provision of food, clothing, and sanitary needs. The guidelines also stipulate that each detainee be officially registered and that the managing organization submit a weekly registration report to the Department of Civil Rights and Immigration (Government of Italy 2007, p. 13; Interior Ministry website). In addition, the WGAD claims that organizations contracted to manage centres are required to provide legal advice to detainees. However, according to the WGAD this legal advice varies in quality, and “the ex-officio lawyers” are not always “very engaged and effective” (WGAD 2009, p. 19).
The corpo militare of the Italian Red Cross (Croce Rossa) serves as a principal private contractor for a number of the expulsion centres—including those in Turin, Milan, Crotone, and Rome—in partnership with the local prefecture in each region. It also assists in the operations of the secure welcome centre in Foggia (Croce Rossa, “Strutture per I migranti”). The government reportedly chose the Red Cross because of its ability to address the humanitarian needs of the detainee population (CDU 2006, p. 84). Among the services the Red Cross provides and/or oversees are food, health care, accommodation, psycho-social counseling, cultural-linguistic assistance, and facility maintenance (Interior Ministry, “I Centri dell’immigrazione”). It does not handle the processing of migrants; it only manages certain aspects of the centres and administers to detainee needs prior to their deportation (Croce Rossa website).
For many years, the Red Cross was the only private organization working inside detention centres while other rights-based groups were frequently denied access to the facilities (HRW 2006). However, various high-profile incidents at centres, including deaths and fires, led the government to broaden the number of organizations involved in the facilities beyond the Red Cross, which claimed to be understaffed (Statewatch 2000). As of 2006, among the other charities and cooperative organizations providing services in detention centres were: Misericordia, in Modena, Bologna, Lampedusa, and Bari Palese; Cooperativa Albatros, in Caltanissetta; Cooperativa Insieme, in Trapani; and the Cooperativa “La Minerva,” in Gradisca d’Isonzo (CDU 2006). In addition, Médicin Sans Frontiers carries out preliminary assessments and triage of newly arrived foreigners on the island of Lampedusa (Government of Italy 2007, p. 11).
Despite repeated requests for information from many of these organizations, as of September 2009, the Global Detention Project had not been able to confirm the current operating status of the organizations in detention centres, apparently reflecting a continuing lack of transparency in the practice of immigration detention in Italy.
The Italian government and the Italian Red Cross have repeatedly been criticized by human rights organizations, the media, and the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) for conditions at immigration detention facilities across the country, and in particular at the facility on Lampedusa (HRW 2006; CPT 2007a). In 2006, a commission was established to assess immigration detention facilities, the “De Mistura Commission.” The commission’s 2007 report contains a detailed assessment of each centre, as well as recommendations for improving the physical environment and management procedures (WGAD 2009, p. 19; De Mistura Commission 2007).
There is little information available on the demographics of the detainee population in Italy. Both the 2007 De Mistura Commission report and the 2006 Comitato Diritti Umani report indicate that men and women are provided separate areas in detention facilities.
NGO and media outlets have reported that minors (both accompanied and unaccompanied) are often detained at immigration detention facilities, particularly on the island of Lampedusa (AI 2006). In January 2009, a coalition of Italian and international NGOs published an appeal highlighting the “alarming conditions” in the centre at Lampedusa and the often prolonged detention of minors at CDAs prior to being transferred to “appropriate reception structures” (AI Italia et al 2009).
Facts and figures. As of September 2009, Italy operated 10 CDAs (secure welcome centres) and 10 CIEs (secure identification and expulsion centres). The country reported an immigration detention capacity of 5,329, including 4,169 beds in the CDAs and 1,160 in the CIEs (Interior Ministry Website, "I Centri dell’immigrazione"). Detention in the CDAs is “strictly limited to the time necessary to determine the identity and qualification for remaining in Italy, and for determining whether or not they should be deported” (Testo Unico 1998 Art. 14). The overall maximum length of detention in CIEs is now 180 days, which requires magistrate approval after each 60 day detention interval expires (Disposizioni in materia di sicurezza pubblica 2009 Art. 1, para. 21).
The numbers of irregular arrivals drastically decreased during the period 1998-2005, even as the “immigration problem” gained increasing public attention and Italy introduced stricter immigration controls. In 1999, 49,999 undocumented individuals were registered as having arrived on Italian territory; by 2005, the number of arrivals had decreased some 50 percent, to 22,939 (Government of Italy 2007, p. 13-14).
According to one source, there were 541,000 irregular migrants in Italy in 2005, 650,000 in 2006, and 349,000 in 2007. Much of the decrease was due to the fact that in 2006 nearly a half a million undocumented non-citizens were granted work permits allowing them to remain in Italy (Blangiardo 2008).
According to the 2007 De Mistura Commission report, some 25,000 non-citizens were detained in immigration detention centres between 2005-2006 (De Mistura Commission 2007, p. 12). 6,800 of these, nearly 31 percent, were from the Roma community. Moroccans, Nigerians, Palestinians, and Tunisians also made up a significant portion of the detainee population during this period.
UNHCR reports that in 2007 there were a total of 14,000 asylum seekers in Italy.
In 2007, approximately 20,000 undocumented migrants arrived to Italy by sea, of which 12,000 disembarked at Lampedusa. Fifty percent of those who arrived by sea applied for asylum, and 57 percent of these asylum seekers received some form of protection (UNHCR “PRAESIDIUM”). In 2008, arrivals by sea increased to some 36,000 people, of which 75 per cent applied for asylum, and roughly half of those received refugee status or protection on other humanitarian grounds (UN Service 2009a).
In the year 2005, the Interior Ministry registered the deportation of some 26,985 undocumented migrants from Italy (Interior Ministry in Fasani 2008, p. 97).
