LASA 2006 Paper

January 9, 2005

Michael Flynn
Rue Gautier 9
Geneva 1201
Switzerland
yammish@yahoo.com
+41 22 731 9668

DEA Candidate in International Relations
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva

Track: Migration & Cross-Border Studies

Where’s the U.S. Border?
Portraits of an Elastic Frontier

Prepared for delivery at the 2006 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico March 15-18, 2006
Introduction: From Soviet Subs to Migrant Smugglers

In October 2004, the U.S.S. Curts—a guided-missile frigate armed with anti-submarine warfare systems, torpedoes, and twin 76-millimeter cannons—was patrolling coastal areas off Latin America’s Pacific Rim when it spotted a suspicious-looking vessel some 240 northeast of the Galapagos Islands and went to intercept. In the mid-1980s, the object of such pursuit could have been one thing only— a Soviet nuclear sub. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the Curts' role in protecting U.S. security has undergone a dramatic metamorphosis: Instead of tracking deadly nuclear submarines, the frigate now chases down smuggling vessels. In this case, the vessel the Curts had in its sights was an Ecuadorian fishing boat that doubled as a migrant smuggling vessel. Packed into the ship’s cargo hold were some 80 undocumented migrants who were on the first leg of a harrowing journey north that included a long ocean passage in a rickety smuggling boat, a perilous border crossing in the region straddling Mexico and Guatemala, and the depredations of unscrupulous coyotes working the U.S.-Mexico border.¹

The Curts represents the vanguard in a growing U.S. effort to push its migration controls south. The U.S. border ceased long ago to be the frontline in the effort to stop unwanted migration. The country uses military bases located in host countries as staging grounds for detention efforts (the Curts routinely uses the U.S. base in Manta, Ecuador), it has funded detention centers in places like Guatemala City, and it has teamed up with law enforcement officials
from other countries to carry out multi-lateral operations aimed at breaking up migrant smuggling activities.

The intent of this paper is to trace the evolution of these beyond-the-borders policies through a close reading of policy statements, congressional testimony and associated documents that detail the practice as far back as the administration of George H. W. Bush. This story is supplemented by an account of how these policies look on the ground in Latin America based on various investigative reports this author has undertaken in Central America, Mexico, and Ecuador.

Finally, this paper seeks to challenge assumptions that have gained traction in recent years about the nature of border control in a globalizing world. In particular, instead of viewing the borders of the developed world as static “fortresses,” I argue that interdiction efforts employed by the United States, and to a lesser extent western Europe, to control who comes and goes can be illustrated more accurately by using the metaphor of “elasticity.”

The Birth of “Global Reach”

In the early 1990s, public concern in the United States over border security and “out of control” immigration reached unprecedented heights, spurred in part by a stagnating economy, terrorism attacks on U.S. soil, and several widely publicized incidents involving undocumented migrants. Public officials and political candidates, capitalizing on this fear, competed over who could develop the most stringent measures. In states like California, public pressure to get
tough on illegal immigration eventually led to passage of anti-immigrant measures that denied public services to undocumented aliens. And the federal government began laying the groundwork for a massive overhaul of its immigration policies and practices.³

Helping to increase tensions were the negotiations between Canada, Mexico, and the United States over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA presented the U.S. government with a seemingly intractable dilemma: How could the country open its borders to the free transit of goods and services—and yet keep out unwanted drugs and migrants?

In 1993, the Clinton administration proposed a one-size-fits-all solution to the problem—the country would build bigger and better walls. The first target was El Paso, Texas, where in 1993 the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) implemented “Operation Hold the Line,” one of a series of border blockade efforts that involved building walls along selected sections of the border, multiplying the number of border guards, and deploying a fleet of jeeps, boats, and helicopters armed with high-tech sensor equipment. No longer would the country wait to detain migrants after they crossed the border; instead, it would employ what the INS called “territorial denial” and “prevention thorough deterrence” strategies meant to keep aliens from reaching U.S. territory. ⁴

While these high-profile activities were drawing widespread media and public attention, below the radar the administration was busy formulating a set of policies aimed at projecting its “prevention through deterrence” strategy beyond the border. In June 1993, then–President Bill Clinton issued
Presidential Decision Directive-9 (PDD-9). Prompted in part by the rise of Asian migrant-smuggling syndicates—in particular, the “snakeheads,” a notorious Chinese smuggling outfit whose activities gained headlines in the early 1990s after the *Golden Venture*, a ship carrying illegal Chinese immigrants, ran aground off Queens in 1993, resulting in the drowning deaths of 10 people—PDD-9 directed a passel of government agencies to “take the necessary measures to preempt, interdict, and deter alien smuggling in the U.S. . . . We will deal with the problem at its source, in transit, at our borders, and within the United States. We will attempt to interdict and hold smuggled aliens as far as possible from the U.S. border and to repatriate them when appropriate.”  

The president outlined the responsibilities each government agency would shoulder:

> “Justice and INS will be responsible for criminal enforcement and all U.S. prosecutions and for conducting law enforcement operations and investigations outside the U.S. . . . State will be responsible for international policy and relations with foreign governments and international organizations. Transportation and Coast Guard will be responsible for interdiction at sea with appropriate support by Defense. . . . The Director of Central Intelligence will be responsible for foreign intelligence in support of interdiction efforts. . . . The Border Security Working Group will be responsible for coordinating the interagency effort overall. Efforts at the Source State will approach source nations whose nationals, businesses, and/or infrastructure provide assistance to alien smuggling and to develop common policies to prevent the departure of criminal-sponsored, non-refugee, and undocumented aliens.”

Various elements of this directive would later be crystallized in an INS-led initiative called “Operation Global Reach.” Global Reach, developed in 1995
and implemented in 1997, entailed an unprecedented expansion of U.S. anti-smuggling and migrant interception activities. According to a 2001 Justice Department fact sheet, Global Reach is a "strategy of combating illegal immigration through emphasis on overseas deterrence." The INS established “40 overseas offices with 150 U.S. positions to provide a permanent presence of immigration officers overseas,” “trained more than 45,000 host-country officials and airline personnel in fraudulent document detection,” and “undertaken special operations to test various illegal migrant deterrence methods in source and transit countries.”

During a 1997 news conference announcing the initiative, then–INS Commissioner Doris Meissner argued that Global Reach was a necessary response to the growing problem of alien smuggling: "Let me be clear about the problem. Migrant trafficking is ruthless, and it has become global. . . . These smuggling organizations will use any means whatsoever to produce profits. We have seen instances of mistreatment as well as cases of murder, rape, torture, forgery, and extortion. All too often, unwitting customers are forced into prostitution, virtual bondage, or criminal activities."  

Although Global Reach is an international program—various U.S. agencies have collaborated with officials in Greece, Spain, India, Turkey, Thailand, China, Vietnam, as well as dozens of other countries—its greatest impact seems to have been in Latin America. As the primary sources of undocumented migration to the United States—as well as the principal regions through which traffickers and migrants from across globe are funneled before
reaching the country—Mexico and Central America have long been a central focus of U.S. cross-border interdiction, even before Global Reach was initiated.

In 1996, the INS District Office in Mexico City began a series of intelligence and anti-smuggling operations called “Operation Disrupt,” which targeted migration and smuggling activities in the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, and Canada. In 1997 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, George Regan, then an INS acting associate commissioner, claimed that as part of Disrupt, INS had undertaken joint operations with foreign counterparts to break up several Latin American and Chinese smuggling organizations.  

In 1997, after Disrupt activities became a part of the overall Global Reach initiative, the INS significantly broadened the scope of its Latin American activities, undertaking annual multilateral interception operations with law enforcement personnel from dozens of Latin American countries. According to activists in these countries, during the operations, INS (and now DHS) agents have accompanied local authorities to restaurants, hotels, border crossings, checkpoints, and airports to help identify and apprehend suspicious travelers.

In a series of yearly press statement in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the agency proudly announced the results of each operation. In 2000, for example, the INS declared that year’s Disrupt operation, “Forerunner,” to be the “largest anti-smuggling operation ever conducted in the Western Hemisphere.” Involving agents from six Latin America countries, the operation nabbed 3,500 migrants and 38 smugglers.
Forerunner was followed in 2001 by “Crossroads International,” which the INS again described as the “largest multinational anti-smuggling operation ever conducted in the Western Hemisphere,” this one resulting in the arrest of 75 smugglers and the interdiction of some 8,000 migrants from 39 countries. “The wide-ranging anti-smuggling operation was directed by the INS Mexico City District Office and involved . . . law enforcement officers in Columbia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, and Peru,” said a press statement.  

**Keeping Them Detained Abroad**

As the number of migrants detained in these and other operations in neighboring countries began to rise in the early part of this decade, some governments began requesting support from the United States to help keep the migrants detained.  

And the United States, in some cases at least, complied. In 2000, for example, the U.S. Catholic Conference of Bishops, which had sent a delegation to Central America to study regional migration issues, issued a scathing press release decrying U.S. interdiction activities in the region. As part of the trip, the Conference representatives visited a prison in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, that was filled with migrants who had been detained during Operation Forerunner. Said the press release:

“We are gravely concerned with the human impact of Operation Forerunner, a multilateral regional effort purportedly designed to apprehend and prosecute human smugglers, or ‘coyotes,’ who provide transport to migrants through the region and on their journey north. We strongly agree that these smugglers, who charge migrants
as much as $5,000 to shepherd their trip, should be captured and brought to justice. However, Operation Forerunner has had the effect of targeting migrants more than the persons who smuggle them, resulting in many migrants being placed in substandard prisons in the region without representation or the opportunity to apply for asylum. In our visit to the Central Penitentiary in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, for example, we spoke with many migrants who had been detained for weeks in miserable conditions, sometimes without adequate food or sanitation. Of course, most had no access to legal representation and many did not know when they would be returned to their country of origin. The results of Operation Forerunner give us pause as to the real objectives of the initiative. In each of the countries visited, the governments apprehended only a handful of ‘coyotes’ while capturing several thousand migrants, jailing many of them, and returning them to their countries. The U.S. government has been intimately involved in these interdiction efforts, offering teams of ‘advisors’ to the Central American governments and paying for the return of extra-regional migrants to their homes. As one U.S. embassy official informed us, ‘It is less expensive to take care of the problem here than when they reach the United States.’

Although the funding of migrant detention centers in other countries has remained largely off the media radar, one case in particular garnered widespread—and embarrassing—attention. In 2001, Kanu Patel, a migrant from India who had paid thousands of dollars to be smuggled halfway across the globe to the United States, was arrested in Mexico along with dozens of his compatriots as they approached the U.S. border. Under pressure from the United States to toughen its stance on illegal migration, Mexico deported the migrants to Guatemala, where they were placed in a squalid detention center that received funding through the U.S. Embassy. After spending eight months in detention and being repeatedly denied medical attention for cardiac pains, Patel committed suicide.
In an interview at the time, Margarita Hurtado, a Guatemalan immigrant-rights advocate, described for me the two U.S.-funded detention centers in Guatemala City, which were closed shortly after Patel's suicide. After Operation Disrupt in Guatemala in 2001, she said, "the centers were filled with people from everywhere--from Ecuador, India, Peru, Syria, Cuba. In one space there were 40 people. Everything was being destroyed, there was no light, no air. They were worse than our jails."

When I asked the U.S. Embassy spokeswoman whether embassy officials had bothered to check on the facilities they were funding, she said she didn't know and referred me to Hipolito Acosta, former head of the INS regional office in Mexico City. Acosta told me that when officials did eventually visit, they "determined that the facilities Guatemala was using were not acceptable. Guatemala is now looking at another location to build a new detention center, which will be almost like a model for Central America. . . . I sent my deputy director to check it out because we are greatly concerned."

While it is unclear whether the United States continues to fund migrant detention centers abroad, U.S. officials have found other ways to work with their partners in neighboring countries to keep alleged migrant smugglers locked up. In one case in 2002, the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy interdicted an Ecuadorian vessel, the San Jacinto, off the coast of Guatemala and towed it to southern Mexico, where the 270 migrants on board were briefly questioned and then repatriated.

Although nominally in the custody of Mexican officials, the five alleged
smugglers--identified by passengers as the crew--were questioned by U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials, who advised them of their rights under the U.S. Constitution. Although the crew had little or no understanding of U.S. laws, the INS officials asked them if they would waive their Miranda rights, which they did. (But as one immigration specialist told me: "What does it mean to tell someone they have a right to an attorney when that attorney is located a thousand miles away in a foreign country?")

According to court documents filed in federal court in Washington, D.C., INS officials then contacted the Justice Department about the case, and the decision was made to file an arrest warrant against the crew. According to one document from the U.S. Attorney's office, "After being expelled from Mexico, the defendants were arrested in Houston, where their flight landed, and taken into custody by federal authorities."

The documents fail to explain how the crew ended up on that flight, or whether they had any idea they were heading to the United States. According to Elita Amato, an attorney who represented the crew members, when they boarded their flight in Mexico, "Their understanding was that they were going to Ecuador."

Speaking on background, a U.S. immigration official in Ecuador solved the mystery, explaining to me during an interview in that country in late 2004: "Mexico would be the country that deported [the crew], and if they choose to deport them by way of the United States, where the plane has a layover, what can we do about it?"
After waiting more than a year for their case to come to trial, the crew members decided in late 2003 to plead guilty to conspiracy to encourage illegal immigration.14

Borders in the War on Terror

With the election of George W. Bush in 2000 and the tragic events of 9/11, border control shifted from being an immigration issue to a central concern of U.S. security policy. The war on terror, envisioned by the administration as an almost perpetual struggle against an opponent who is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere, has spurred the United States to take a number of dramatic steps aimed at securing its ports of entry and to pick up its rhetoric regarding the potential dangers that lie just south of the border.

Increasingly, Bush administration officials, as well as their supporters, have taken to calling various regions in Latin America as a “third border,” an area so fraught with potential peril that the United States needs to assume responsibility for ensuring its stability. Thomas Donnelly, an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, which serves as a home base for neoconservative intellectuals and is a key promoter of the administration’s war on terror, puts it this way:

Even if the military role in direct homeland defense should be a narrow one, the traditional understanding of the priority of the Western Hemisphere to U.S. security needs to be recovered by the Pentagon. The reaction to the 9/11 attacks has had the paradoxical effect of diverting attention from America’s neighbors in Latin America, particularly from the Caribbean basin and northern South America. These territories have long been regarded, most notably in the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary, as crucial to providing strategic
depth to the defense of the continental United States. Taken collectively, the region represents America's "third border."\textsuperscript{15}

In November 2002, an anonymous U.S. official justified giving military aid to help the Dominican Republic’s army seal its border with Haiti by saying, “We are beginning to think of the Caribbean as the third border, an area for moving drugs, moving money, and as a high possibility for moving terrorism.” \textsuperscript{16}

One of the administration’s most dramatic moves to strengthen its borders and territory has been the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), an unwieldy bureaucratic behemoth whose many arms cover a bewildering range of responsibilities. But while this new department helped centralize authority for several disparate agencies, it had the paradoxical effect of making outside efforts to track many U.S. activities, especially those carried out in other countries, increasingly difficult. This has been due in part to the administration’s efforts to push for unprecedented levels of government secrecy and also to the blurring of the roles of various agencies now under DHS.\textsuperscript{17}

Since the 2001 INS press release regarding the “successes” of Operation Crossroads International, U.S. immigration officials have not released any information about its interdiction efforts in neighboring countries, and efforts to follow up on programs like Global Reach have become difficult due to confusion over who exactly is overseeing the program.\textsuperscript{18} A DHS official I spoke to in 2003 told me that although Global Reach was still in operation, U.S. officials were no longer participating in large, multilateral interdiction efforts.
Instead, she said, officials were focusing on individual cases on a country-by-country basis. ¹⁹

The most visible element of U.S. cross-border interdiction during the Bush administration has been stepped up maritime activities, as well as the use of military bases in the region as staging grounds for anti-smuggling operations.

A key component of these interdiction efforts is the U.S. Coast Guard, whose activities have increasingly been supported by the U.S. Navy. Long a key player in U.S. efforts to stem narco-trafficking and contain migration crises in the Caribbean, the Coast Guard’s “national security” mandate was expanded in the early 1990s by a succession of presidential decrees. In testimony before Congress in 1999, Coast Guard Captain Anthony S. Tangemon described the orders:

President [George H.W.] Bush issued [Executive Order] 12807 in 1992, directing the Secretary of Transportation to issue appropriate instructions to the Coast Guard to enforce the suspension of the entry of undocumented aliens into the U.S. by sea and to interdict the vessels carrying them. President [Bill] Clinton issued PDD-9 [Presidential Decision Directive-9] in June 1993, directing the Coast Guard and other Federal law enforcement agencies to cooperate in the suppression of alien smuggling. ²⁰

In recent years, much of the Coast Guard’s efforts have focused on the Pacific rim of the Americas, which has seen a spike in the number of Chinese and Ecuadorean smuggling vessels. ²¹ The boats, which carry migrants from as far away as Asia and the Middle East, tend to be rickety, overloaded death
traps that struggle up the coast to clandestine landings in Guatemala and southern Mexico.  

During a reporting trip to Guatemala in 2002, an Ecuadorian I met at a church-run migrant shelter in Guatemala City told me that the boat he had arrived on was loaded with 200 migrants from several countries. “There [at the Ecuadorean port of Guayaquil] they arrive from everywhere,” he told me. “They come from China and Saudi Arabia. And then they come here. In my boat, there were also Peruvians and Colombians.” Most of the migrants, he said, had “coyotes” (smugglers) waiting for them when the boat landed on Guatemala’s southern coast. “I found a coyote when I got here, but he took $5,000 from me and then hid me for several days. I finally escaped and went to a relative’s home in Huehuetenango [a city in the Guatemalan highlands].”  

Although its principal mission is to patrol the coast for illegal narcotics trafficking, the Coast Guard (sometimes with the support of the U.S. Navy or its counterparts in Mexico) regularly intercepts migrant smuggling boats, often for legitimate humanitarian purposes. Most of the vessels do not have the proper conditions to transport migrants and lack emergency equipment. Often, the migrants are sent to detention facilities in the southern Mexican city of Tapachula or Guatemala City to await deportation.  

Since early 2000, the Coast Guard’s efforts in the Pacific have been bolstered by the operation of surveillance planes flying out of the U.S. military base in Manta, Ecuador. The base, which has become a lightening rod for criticism of U.S. actions and intentions in Latin America, is widely believed to
Flynn 16

play a key role in the effort to detain unwanted migration at its source. Since the base was established, U.S. ships that routinely use Manta as a temporary base have detained thousands of undocumented migrants heading north and even destroyed suspected smuggling vessels in Ecuadorian waters, a practice that has been loudly decried in that country and been subject to an Ecuadorian congressional investigation.

Furor over U.S. interdiction efforts in the region erupted in October 2004 after a U.S. Navy frigate intercepted an Ecuadorian fishing vessel carrying some 80 migrants 240 miles northeast of the Galapagos Islands. When the migrants arrived in Manta, they immediately denounced the abuses they had suffered at the hands of U.S. sailors who, they said, had mistreated several detainees in an effort to identify the crew. One of the detainees told reporters that sailors had beaten a polio victim with an iron bar "because he didn't get up fast enough." The migrants also claimed that the navy frigate sank the fishing vessel.

Responding to the allegations, Glenn Warren, U.S. embassy spokesperson, said, "This is the first time that we have had a problem of this kind. We respect human rights and we have a humanitarian policy that has saved thousands of lives which were in danger on the high seas."

The incident came on the heels of a highly publicized report released in July 2004 by the Quito-based Latin American Association for Human Rights (ALDHU) accusing U.S. Navy ships based at Manta of having sunk eight Ecuadorian fishing boats in the country's territorial waters since 2001. (Ecuador
defines its territory as extending 200 nautical miles from its coast, as opposed to the 12 nautical miles established by the Law of the Seas.) Five of the boats, according to ALDHU, were carrying undocumented migrants, all of whom were detained and repatriated. Crews on the other boats were simply fishing.

Although U.S. officials denied sinking or interdicting vessels in Ecuadorian waters, Ecuador's government was unable to diffuse the controversy. A coalition of social and labor organizations called for the termination of the U.S. lease in Manta on the grounds that the United States had violated both the terms of the agreement and Ecuadorian law. The coalition also lodged complaints with the Organization of American States and the United Nations.

While Ecuador has so far refused to go back on its agreement to allow the United States use of the Manta base, the country has repeatedly refused the U.S. military to use the base as part of its global war on terror. Its intransigence on this issue has angered a number of U.S. politicians, including Alabama Republican Sonny Callahan, who argued that aid to Ecuador should be cut off unless Ecuador changes its position. The United States spent millions on the Manta base, said Callahan, "And yet they're telling us they're not going to allow us to use it for anything that has to do with Operation Enduring Freedom."  

**Wall or elastic band?**

As these portraits of the U.S. elastic frontier reveal, U.S. border control efforts have undergone a dramatic metamorphosis in recent years as the United
States has attempted to implement practices aimed at stopping migrants long before they reach U.S. shores. This elasticity raises questions about how we define U.S. border policies today. A classic example of how these policies are described was offered by Peter Andreas in 2000, when he described the “ambitious and innovative state efforts to regulate the transnational movement of people” as the construction of a “wall around the West.”

Increasingly, however, observers have recognized that static metaphors like fortress or wall do not adequately capture all that is happening on the ground. For instance, in a 1999 report for the U.S. Committee on Refugees, Melanie Nezer wrote that “cooperation among North and Central American governments [on migrant interdiction] has led to a ‘southward migration’ of the Mexico-U.S. border.”

Even U.S. officials have begun openly portraying border controls in ways evocative more of flexibility than sturdiness. Robert Bonner, Commissioner of the DHS’s Customs and Border Protection unit said in a 2004 statement to Congress that the United States has programs that “have been put in place at--and beyond--our borders.” These programs, he said, were aimed at “pushing our borders out” to impede the flow of undesirable people.

While it is indeed the case that since the early 1990s the U.S. border has been hardened in a number of ways—most dramatically by building actual walls—it is misleading to think that the country’s efforts stop there. Thus the inadequacy of the fortress metaphor.
Rather, the U.S. border in an age dominated by a global war on terrorism and the effects of economic globalization has become a flexible point of contention whose real presence can be both everywhere and nowhere at the same time—just like the migrants, terrorists, and smugglers at whom U.S. border controls are aimed. The most apt image to capture this phenomenon is one that takes into account this state of constant flux. Just such an image was fashioned by the Catholic Legal Immigration Network (CLINIC) in its 2001 publication *Chaos on the U.S.-Mexico Border*. In describing the “expansion of [U.S.] enforcement efforts beyond the nation’s territorial limits,” CLINIC argued that the border should be seen “less as a fixed boundary than as an elastic line that expands outward and inward.”\(^3\)

---

2. The most well known incident involved the *Golden Venture*, a ship carrying illegal Chinese immigrants that ran aground off Queens in 1993, resulting in the drowning deaths of 10 people.
10. U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “Largest Multinational Alien Smuggling Operation Results in 7,898 Arrests in Latin America and


14 Information about this incident, as well as the quotes from officials and others, from Michael Flynn, “U.S. Stretching Borders to Block Migrants,” Inter Press Service, July 31, 2003; and Michael Flynn, “A Serendipitous Layover?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Jan./Feb. 2005

15 Thomas Donnelly, “Homeland Defense and the U.S. Military,” American Enterprise Institute, November 1, 2004
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.21484/pub_detail.asp
(Accessed on January 8, 2006)


17 For more on INS’s confusing transition to DHS, see Jeanne Butterfield, “Coordination in the Reorganized Immigration and Naturalization Service,” In Defense of the Alien, Volume XXVI (Center for Migration Studies, 2003).

18 Another reason for U.S. reluctance to publicize its cross-border efforts could be the sensitivity to these operations among officials in the region. In Mexico, for instance, several officials denied that Mexican authorities had played any role in the 2001 operation, Crossroads International. “We have no knowledge of the operation,” said a spokesperson for then-Mexican Foreign Secretary Jorge Castaneda. Asked by a reporter about the operation, another official, Felipe de Jesus Preciado, then head of Mexico’s National Migration Institute, said, “Maybe I should ask you about it.” Both quotes from Susan Ferriss, Cox News, June 30, 2001.


21 For a description of Coast Guard migrant interdiction efforts, see U.S. Coast Guard, “Alien Migrant Interdiction,” http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/AMIO/AMIO.htm
(Accessed on January 8, 2006)


24 Flynn, ibid.

25 Bruce Finley, “U.S. Takes Border War on the Road,” Denver Post, December 19, 2004


27 This description of the incident comes from Flynn, ibid.

28 Cited in Flynn, ibid.